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Summary:
We hope to clarify an implication of the efficient market theory that
may have been overstated. Specifically, even in the presence of market
efficiency in the semi-strong form, the form of disclosure may have
substantive bearing on the choice between two information systems that
provide the same amount of information.
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Introduction
In a series of three papers [Beaver (1972, 1973, 1974)], William H,
Beaver has provided the accounting profession with an important intro-
duction to the efficient market literature* He has succeeded in bringing
about a general willingness within the profession to accept the efficient
market theory in the semi-strong form and to consider seriously the impli-
cations of that acceptance on the formulation of accounting principles
[e.g., FASB (1976), pp. 38-42], Unfortunately these implications may
have beexi overstated. Beaver and others suggest that in the presence of
markets efficient in the semi-strong form, principle setting should concern
itself only with what should be disclosed and whether those disclosures can
be effected most economically through the accounting information set. The
current paper will review some of the literature evidencing these implica-
tions » and then will illustrate that it is possible that a given accounting
system can be improved upon such that it Pareto dominates the original
system, even though it continues to disclose the same information. That
is, Pareto dominance can be achieved solely through a change in the form
of disclosure,
Biermsn (1974, p, 557), in contending that implications of the
efficient markets theory are overstated, specifically contends:
(a) It has not been shown that the efficient market
hypothesis reduces the importance of improving con-
ventional financial accounting,
Bierman does not distinguish whether he is referring to "improving con-
ventional financial accounting" by changing the amount of Information
disclosed or the form in which it is disclosed, Beaver (1974, p, 566)
responds only to the possibility of changing the amount of information
disclosed. He refers the reader to another of his papers [Beaver (1973),
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pp. 54-56], but the most relevant section on those pages, i,e. ( that one
ending with: "Disclosure is a substantive issue." (p. 55), only responds
directly to Bierman f s contention relative to the amount of information*
In a paper which had considerable exposure among practicing ac-
countants, Beaver (1973) makes statements that might indicate that the
form of disclosure should not be considered by the FASB:
First: Many reporting issues are trivial and do not
warrant an expenditure of FASB resources. The
properties of such issues are twofold? (1) There
is essentially no difference in cost to the firm of
reporting either method. (2) There is essentially
no cost to statement users in adjusting from one
method to the other. In such cases* there is a
simple solution. Report one method, with sufficient
footnote disclosure to permit adjustment to the
other, and let the market interpret impliestions of
the data for security prices, (p. 52)
The naive investor can still get harmed, but not in
the ways traditionally thought. For example, the
potential harm is not likely to occur because firms
use flow-through v, deferral for accounting for in-
vestment credit, (p. 53)
In the conclusion:
1. Kany reporting issues are capable of a simple
disclosure solution and do not warrant an ex-
penditure of FASB time in attempting to resolve
them.
3» Financial statements should not be reduced to
the level of understanding of the naive investor,
(p. 56)
One can infer that Beaver is not concerned with whether individuals may
be unable to properly interpret financial statements (except that they
may be caused to incur excessive commission costs attempting to earn abnormal
returns)
.
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Beaver* s paper appears to have had an impact on the profession, at
least to the extent of the FASB 5 s Tentative. Conclusions on Objectives
Financial Statements of Business Enterprises (1976) which adopts similar
implications of the presence of an efficient markets
Among the implications accompanying acceptance of the
efficient racket hypothesis are: that accountants 1
and managements* often expressed concern about con-
fusing investors by giving them too much information
is probably not a valid concern; and that the account-
ing profession has probably spent too much time effort
and money attempting to resolve problems that could as
readily have been handled simply by additional dis-
closure * (p. A 2)
The purpose of the present paper is not to state that the amount
of disclosure is not an important issue, but rather to point uy that
form of disclosure remains an Important issue even under the assumption
that markets are efficient in the semi-strong form.
An Interpretation of an Xnformationally
Efficient Form of Disclosure
In his survey of the empirical literature, Fssa (1970) suggested
that a market is efficient with respect to some set of information if
that set of information is "fully reflected" in prices. Although the
expression "fully reflect" has become synonymous with empirical tests
demonstrating that excess returns cannot be earned, it is ambiguous*
One way of conveying the idea of "fully reflect" more precisely is to
say that a market is informational!? efficient with respect to some set
of information A* say, where A may be ail publicly available information*
if the prices it generates are identical to those generated in an other-*
wise identical market in which each and every investors expectations are
correctly specified on the basis of A, This is pointed out by Rubinstein

(1975) in greater detail . A more informal way of expressing this is to
say that a market is informational!}* efficient if market expectations t
as represented by prices, aggregate the diverse opinions of investors in
such a fashion that the prices which result are those that would have
resulted had each investor ; s expectations been correctly specified on
the basis of A, (Later in the paper a specific example will be given
which illustrates this,)
The motivation behind this interpretation comes from the suggestion
in the empirical literature that excess returns cannot be earned. If
a market is informationsIly efficient with respect to all publicly avail-
able information, then the theory implies that anyone whose expectations
are correctly specified on the basis of ail publicly available information
would not be expected to earn an excess return because the prices he en-
counters in the market are identical to those he would encounter in an
otherwise identical market in which everyone* s expectations are correctly
specified on the basis of all publicly available Information* Consequently
he sees his expectations as "fully reflected" in prices despite the fact
that no one else may actually have an assesssient as accurate as his.
To re-cast this interpretation in an accounting context, we will
represent a form of disclosure by n* r\ will be said to be information-
ally efficient with respect to all publicly available Information if the
prices that result when n is used to disclose the activities of firms
are identical to those chat arise in an otherwise identical market in
which each investor's expectations are correctly specified on the basis
of all publicly available information* Let H represent the set of all

~5~
the various forms of disclosure that are infor-nationally efficient with
respect to all publicly available information.
Clearly since all members of H disclose information in such a fashion
that a -market is efficient with respect to all publicly available infor-
mation, we should be indifferent as to which siezaber of K is used if our
sole concern were market information efficiency. However * it may be that
some members of H strictly Fareto dominate other members. That is, we
have the following proposition.
Proposition * All investors may strictly prefer one form of disclosure
to another despite the fact that both effect market information efficiency.
An Example to Validate the Proposition
Let us consider a one-period market that offers two securities*
one of which is risk-free in that it has a fixed yield, and the other
of which is risky in that its return is uncertain. Let S represent
the risk-free security; it will be assumed that there is an unlimited
supply of S available, each share of which sells for one dollar (i.e.,
F
the price of S is a numeraire). S will represent the risky security;
each share of S^ sells for ? dollars, We will assume that there are
E
693,000 shares of S available. In addition shares of both S and S p
R, i? j£V
are assumed to be infinitely divisible.
Each full share of $_, purchased at che beginning of the period
yields an end-of-pericd return of 1.03 dollars* whereas a full share of
S„ yields a random end-of-year return B which is equal to either 1.08
or 0.98 dollars* Which of the two possible returns R assumes will
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depend upon the end~of-year performance of the risky investment. Let
us imagine, however, that the true underlying distribution of returns
of R on the basis of ail publicly available information should be
R - 1.08 with probability 2/3, and R * 0.98 with probability 1/3.
Suppose that 100,000 investors participate in the market at the
beginning of the year to adjust their holdings of risk-free and risky
securities. We will represent each investor by I , i a 1, «.., (100 s 000),
and allow each to be endowed with S r and S„ units of risk-free and risky
securities, respectively. Then the wealth I has available, for investing
at the beginning of the period is
W1 « ?| * P*S| (1)
Let us suppose that each investor will express his preference for wealth
x as if it could be represented by the utility function tr(x) * -expf-x].
Then, assuming each investor is Savage rational, his expected utility for
i iholding S^ units of the risk-free and S" units of the risky security,
respectively, would bet
E[u\'s!;,sb}
» .exp[-1.03-St,] {expl-1.08*s;]-P1 [R = 1.08]+exp[-0,98»si]«P [R - 0.9S]}, (2)
JF K K
where f^[R * 1.08], r [R * 0.981 represents I *s expectation, or belief,
that R 1.03, R « 0.9S„ respectively, at the end of the period.
We will now consider two hypothetical situations that are distin-
guishable solely by the form of disclosure that is employed. Let n
represent the form used in the first situation. r\ reports on the activities
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of the risky investment up until and including the beginning of the
period. Let us imagine that n provides such a thoroughly clear and
understandable presentation of information about the risky investment
that each investor has the correct assessment of R on the basis of aii
publicly available information, Specifically, for i « 1, »»„, (100,000),
?
1
[R « 1,08 | n] m 2/3
P^R * 0.98
1 n j * 1/3
When n is employed, each investor { s holdings of risk-free and risky
i i
securities after tradings 3„, ? Se * respectively, as well as P itself, can
be computed
:
Syjn * W1 - 6c 93
Sjljti * 6.93
?jn ^0.67
Note that differences in endowed wealth result in different levels of S '.
(Refer to Appendix for the derivation of SF )n 3 S^|ris Pjil).
Suppose that an alternative form of disclosure, r( *, can be employed
to report on the activities of the investment » It will be assumed that
n
1 is significantly less clear and understandable than n and consequently
results in expectations that are misspecified. For example suppose
that on the basis of n' exactly one-half of the investors are overly
optimistic about the performance o£ the risky investment and expect
P^R - 1.08|n'] * 4/5
P
1 [R « 0.98|n'3 - 1/5 s

i « 1, ...» (50,000). The second half of the investors are siaxpiy
confused when n* is used and consequently regard R * l*08j R * 0.98
as equally likely events!
v
x {r ** x.osSn*] - 1/2
P*[R - 0,98|n ? ] - 1/2 s
i » (50*001), »«*» (100*000) . With these expectations, holdings and prices
will be as specified below %
for i « 1, *.., (50,000) for i * (50,001), ..«, (100,000)
sjjn- * W1 - 13,86 S^jr** - W1
S*jn s - 13.86 S*|n f -
?jn< « 0,67
(Refer to Appendix for derivation)
*
The salient feature of these ttso situations is that the prices of
risk-free and risky securities are identical to those that would arise
if each and every investor* a expectations were correctly specified.
(Of coursej r? satisfies this requirement by definition) . Thus both
achieve market information efficiency with respect to ail publicly
available information*
nonetheless, n Pareto dominates n*. To demonstrate this, let us
consider each investor's expected utility in the two situations assuming
that his expectations had been correctly specified « Wien r\ is employed,
each I"4" holds (after trading) W - 6*93 shares of £L, and 6.93 shares of
S„. Thus his expected utility can be derived by substituting these
"* i i *"
values for S* s S_ in equation (1), and letting F [R - 1.08} «* 2/3,
Pi [R - 0,98} * 1/32
i
E[U (*r~6.93* 6.93)] - ~<»94) e ~-ulu*
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When r\* is employed, I , 1*1, . .., (50,000) > holds VP - 13.86 shares of
S^ and 13.86 shares of S_ after trading* Thus his expected utility for
these holdings j assuming that his expectations have been correctly
specified would be (use equation (1) with r [R « 1.08] 2/3,
P
1
^ * 0.98] * 1/3) J
j
*T.y*'
E[Ui (Wi-13.86, 13.86)} * -e
"" l4 °3W
For I*, 1 s (50,001), ***$ (100 s 000)j trading when n* is employed results
in purchasing no shares of the risky security. Thus his expected utility
would be
i
Eft^CW
1
, 0)3 - -e
~1,03W
Since the expected utility of each individual regardless of his endowed
wealth is greater when n is employed than when n' is employed, r\ strictly
Parsto dominates n*.
Summary
The intuition that motivates this example is very simple. Whichever
reporting alternative is chosen, prices remain the same* Thus each inves-
tor *s endowed wealth is unaffected by the choice of reporting mechanism.
But when n is employed, investors have a better, or more correct,
assessment of the uncertainty and consequently allocate their holdings
correctly. On the other hand when n* is used, expectations are less
well specified, which results in a less appropriate allocation of
shares and, in turn, a lower expected utility* The point is that
market information efficiency assures a correct assessment of the
aggregate expectation, prices* But the accuracy of individual expec-
tations will dictate whether a form of disclosure will be preferred

at an Individual level* There-fore ^e should be concerned with a choice
among forms of disclosure despite the substantial empirical evidence
that the market is efficient with respect to all publicly available
information.
Although the discussion stops short of suggesting how a form of
disclosure sight be selected to improve upon the statue quo, we can make
some broad inferences* First of all, homogeneous expectations do not
currently prevail in the market However s as is demonstrated in the
previous example, if tvo forms of disclosure achieve information effi-
ciency (with respect tc all publicly available information) such that
the first implies homogeneous beliefs while the second implies hetero-
geneous j then the former will Pareto dominate the latter, In other
words if a form of dlecio&ure exists which achieves information effi-
ciency and at th«s ssme time induces greater homogeneity among market
participants then under the tons of disclosure implied by the status
quo j then it will Pareto dominate the status quo, Thus it is reasonable
to conduce that a forsx of disclosure which brings about the greatest
homogeneity in expectations (while maintaining market information effi-
ciency) will very likely be the beet for© of disclosure.
M/3/63
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FOOTNGTES
Considering an investor *s expected utility for the two forms of dis~
closure assuming that his expectations had been correctly specified
answers the question: Which of the two fcriris of disclosure would an
investor have preferred ex ante if the correct expectation were to be
revealed to him after trading? Jaffee-Kuhinstein (1977), Ng (1975),
and Verrecchia (1978) each argue (in greater detail) that this is the
correct way to assess which hypothetical situation will be preferred-
since it requires that each situation be evaluated on the basis of the
same expectation, i.e* s the correct one. In particular, this avoids a
type of "apples versus oranges" problems for example, preferring one
form of disclosure to another simply because the first induces wildly
optimistic (but grossly incorrect) expectations while the other Irapi ies
a more sober and more accurate assessment of uncertainty,
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AfFEKDIX
When trading commences in the market each investor adjusts bis holdings
of risk-free and risky securities so as to maximise his expected utility sub-
ject to his budget constraints That is, he maximizes equation (2) subject
\ i *" i **
to (1) * For convenience let f^ and £„ represent P [R*l»08] and P l%.-0*98],
respectively, and R., and S.„ represent 1*08 and 0*98, respectively,
1 i
1» A Derivation of S,, and S*,*
~ pv————
F
The Lagrange multiplier implied by (i) and (2) is
L(S*, sj» X 1 ) - EUX(S^ S*) - X.^S* + PsJ - W1)
Differentiating L with respect to S^T yields
at -(fsJ + rs:) ~<fs; + R.sb , ,
—r F^e x, + ELe r - X ? * (1A)
R
-:
Differentiating L with respect to S~ yields
3L _
"<FS
F
+ V?-i
,
,
- (F4 + R2SR> i
—r <* F e i, + F e f« « X
q
i
To obtain a S_„ Sw that maximizes L set 31 rt , SLR F —~ = and —r * Qi
3S
R 3Sp
~(FS*» + V2>i p
~ (FS
F
+ R
2
SR>i *
(2A)
^e f" - XT, (3A)
Fa r. +!e f « A (4A)

Then divide (4A) into (3A) ; this implies
-*1«£ 4 R_SX i>~ <- X /- fAY,-.*.
1 i z 2
m T>
i i ^
'
* e f, + F e £ ?
Simplifying (5A)
or
R,e
X 2 X + iUfJ^FPU Kf7-ff:i,
-(R, - R^)S„ .
e
ivf£[R
1
~ m * 4 [FP " R2 ]
"2
x
2?
Consequently
2. A Derivation o£ P.
To derive the price of a risky security f p ? sum (6A) over i:
i ^
_ 100,000 . 100,000 -
I
JL-FP f^ j
S * E S" « ^* ——£—~ in
i 2 <- J
x-
( ) f i
'
!R -fp ] 1100,000 fr* i
Hi* , < (100,000) In j-^- j + In j n
-f }
(5A)
Finally, this implies
f i<
i 3 VFP £I
s
r * or^ry in Z (6A)
S
R
(7A)
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Rearranging we have
I I
1j «- i
FP~R
;XOQ«00Q f 1
(100.000) In I i*l ..i j 100,000
D
R
r
1 i
Then cake the exponential factor of each side to obtain
FP-R
2
[100,000 fj ]
100
'
000
i*l f
xi
exp
R.
-iC
J. ii
1100,000 R
i J
Solving for P yields
P •
X 0,.iirrr) R, + (t^t) Rj
'1+0' 1 •KT 2" <8A)
where
100,000 ei- .-5
A.
100,000
i
K
l 2 X
100,000 R <9A)
By substituting the values
SZ * 693,000
is.
R
1
- la OS lo03 R„ « Qo9S
and when n is employed
f
l "
2/3 _i
"2 1/3 !•] s « * « * (100,000),
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and when rr is employed
f* <* 4/5 f* * 1/5 1-1,.. .,(50,000)
f* * 1/2 f£ * 1/2 1«(5Q, 001),. .,(100,000),
i i
^e can derive P, S"» S^ by axeana of equations (6A)
,
(7A)
,
(8A) 5 and <9A)



